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DEMOCRATS AT DOJ:
WHY PARTISAN USE OF THE VOTING




In notable ways, the ongoing dispute over redistricting in Texas offers a
mirror image to one of the major redistricting battles of the last decade, only
with Democratic and Republican roles reversed. In both Texas v. United States
and Georgia v. Ashcroft, a state attorney general (AG) decided he would not
ask the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) to approve new redistricting
plans enacted in his state. In both cases, the state AGs were well aware that the
Voting Rights Act (VRA) required them to obtain federal approval, known as
preclearance, before changing any aspect of their state's election laws and
procedures, and both knew that the new redistricting plans were indisputably
the type of changes that needed federal approval. Both, moreover, believed
(and would later argue) that the plans satisfied the statutory standard for
approval, namely, that they had neither the purpose nor the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote based on race or language minority status.I Still,
both Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott and Georgia Attorney General
Thurbert E. Baker wanted to avoid the Department of Justice at all costs.
Both AG Abbott and AG Baker wanted to steer clear of the DOJ because
they suspected the Justice Department would not look kindly on the partisan
redistricting plans adopted in their states. In both the Texas and Georgia cases,
the plans at issue had been designed to award a disproportionate number of
legislative seats to either Republican or Democratic candidates at a time when
the DOJ was under the partisan control of the opposing party. Added to that,
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2 006).
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both plans had generated criticism disputing the AGs' belief that the plans
complied with the VRA. 2
Both AG Abbott and AG Baker accordingly decided they would seek
preclearance in federal district court in Washington, D.C., a long-established
route to preclearance that nevertheless is rarely pursued because it has
repeatedly proven more costly and far slower than the administrative process
on offer at the DOJ. Both AGs were willing to undertake these costs because
both were convinced, and rightl so, that the DOJ would not be impressed with
the states' redistricting efforts. As it happened, both the Bush and Obama
administrations objected to the plans at issue, arguing that they violated the
VRA by offering inadequate representation to each state's minority
populations.4
There is fair debate as to whether the Bush administration's more
expansive reading of the VRA in Georgia would have better protected
Georgia's African American voters than did the narrower one pressed by the
state's Democratic leadership and ultimately endorsed by the Supreme Court.5
What is beyond dispute, however, is that the Republican DOJ's stance in the
case mapped onto the strategic interests of the Republican Party. Equally
certain, a Democratic DOJ would have promptly approved the Georgia plan,
2. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment Pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 and Request for Three-Judge Court at 1, Texas v. United States, No.
1:11 -cv-01303 (RMC-TBG-BAH) (D.D.C. July 19, 2011), available at http://legaltimes.
typepad.com/files/texas-complaint.pdf. In the present round of redistricting, AG Abbott was
not alone in mistrusting DOJ review. See Justin Levitt, Who Draws the Lines?, ALL ABOUT
REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.ls.edu/who-preclear.php (last visited Feb. 16, 2011)
(reporting that Michigan, like Texas, sought preclearance exclusively in federal court, while
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia sought both
judicial and administrative preclearance).
3. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 471 (2003); see also Charles S. Bullock III
& Ronald K. Gaddie, What If the Courts Have to Handle Section 5 Reviews-Lots of Them?,
S. POL. REP. (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.southernpoliticalreport.com/storylink_39_1869
.aspx ("Georgia's Democratic leadership feared that the Justice Department would not
approve the gerrymanders.").
4. Hindsight now shows AG Abbott erred, at least with regard to the plan for the
state senate, which the DOJ apparently would have precleared. See Answer/Memorandum at
5, Texas v. United States, No 1:11-cv-01303 (RMC-TBG-BAH) (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2011).
The DOJ raised no objection to the state Senate plan, though several civil rights groups did.
See Ryan J. Reilly, DOJ: Rick Perry's Texas Congressional Redistricting Map Violates
Voting Rights Act, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Sept. 19, 2011, 4:57 PM), http://tpmmuckraker
.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/09/justice department signalsconcerns withrickperrys-te
xas redistricting map.php?ref-fpb.
5. Compare Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of its
Own Success?, 104 COLuM. L. REV. 1710, 1728 (2004) (arguing that Georgia's introduction
of governance considerations into section 5 analysis protects minority voting power by
enhancing local political coalition building), with Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and
the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J. 21, 33-34 (2004) (arguing that section 5
retrogression analysis is weakened by incorporating governance considerations that are not
readily observable by the DOJ or the courts, among other concerns).
416 [Vol. 23:2
which, in turn, would have benefited the Democratic Party. 6
Texas v. United States suggests a similar dynamic. True, the case is still
being litigated such that a full assessment of the various claims at issue remains
premature. Still, it looks like DOJ's present stance in the case maps onto the
strategic interests of the Democratic Party. It also seems likely that a
Republican-controlled DOJ would have approved the Texas plan, which would
have been beneficial to the Republican Party.
In other words, both Texas and Georgia show that Democrats enforce
voting rights differently from Republicans. Often this means that Democrats
enforce voting rights more expansively and aggressively than do Republicans,
but as Georgia shows, not always. More consistently, Democrats enforce
voting rights in ways that tend to advance Democratic interests while
Republican-led enforcement tends to produce benefits for Republicans. This
Article explores whether these differences should be cause for concern.
In exploring this question, let's assume that the party of the sitting
President stands to benefit from VRA enforcement actions taken by the DOJ.
We can remain agnostic as to whether the pursuit of partisan gain best explains
any particular DOJ decision. The argument I want to pursue is not that agency
officials, be they Democrats or Republicans, necessarily seek partisan benefits
when making enforcement decisions. Instead, I am interested in examining
whether we should be worried about partisan use of the VRA by the DOJ,
based on the supposition-as distinct from the argument-that the DOJ
enforces the VRA in ways that benefit the political party of the administration
6. See, e.g., Georgia, 539 U.S. at 544-48 (discussing Democratic support for
unpacking majority-minority districts); Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 1716-17 (noting
"charges of partisan misuse of the preclearance process of the VRA").
7. There is good reason to think that the Obama administration is not pursuing such
gain, and not simply because U.S. Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Thomas Perez has
disavowed such motivation. See Shira Toeplitz & Joshua Miller, DOJ Redistricting Point
Man: No Magic Formula, ROLL CALL (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/
57 39/DOJ-Redistricting-Point-Man-No-Magic-Formula-209319-1.html (quoting AAG
Perez, "One of my principal goals in coming here, not only in the voting section, but across
the board, is to make sure that politics doesn't infect the decision-making process . . . .").
Rather, the agency has repeatedly declined to take enforcement actions that would have
devolved to the benefit of the Democratic Party. See, e.g., John Merrigan, Georgia 's
Redistricting Lines Approved by Justice Department, WSAV.COM (Dec. 23, 2011, 7:09
PM), http://www2.wsav.com/news/2011 /dec/23/3/georgias-redistricting-lines-approved
-justice-depa-ar-2923682 (reporting that a Democrat-led DOJ approved redistricting plans
that would create a Republican super-majority in both chambers of the state legislature);
Aaron Gould Sheinin, Justice Dep't Approves Georgia Voter Verification System, ATLANTA
J.-CONST. (Aug. 23, 2010, 11:30 AM), http://blogs.ajc.com/georgia elections news/2010/
08/23/justice-department-approves-georgia-voter-verification-system (reporting that a
Democrat-led DOJ approved a state plan to check voter information against drivers license
and Social Security databases). But see Charlie Savage, Justice Dep 't Cites Race in Halting
Law over Voter ID, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
12/24/us/justice-department-rejects-voter-id-law-in-south-carolina.html? r-1 (reporting that
a Democratic DOJ blocked a rule requiring photo identification to vote).
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in power.
Imagine, then, that Assistant Attorney General Thomas Perez characterized
the Justice Department's stance in Texas as an effort to block a vigorous
Republican gerrymander and announced that the agency was using the VRA as
a convenient legal hook to accomplish this purpose. What if this statement
accurately described the reality of the DOJ's purpose in the Texas case? Would
such partisan use of the VRA prevent the statute from operating as we think it
should?
I would like to explore here the possibility that it would not. In so doing,
we will have to part company with various commentators who have long
viewed partisan use of the VRA as distasteful and destructive.9 But note, the
idea is not simply that partisan use of the VRA by the DOJ in cases like Texas
is benign. Rather, the argument I want to pursue here is that partisan use of the
VRA in cases like Texas may facilitate the regime's operation in productive
ways.
To be clear, in referencing cases "like Texas," I mean those in which the
legal arguments made to support the DOJ's ostensible partisan agenda are
subject to a full airing in federal court. Thus, Georgia is a similar case, as are
the ongoing disputes about voter identification in South Carolina and Texas. 10
Distinguishable cases are those in which partisan motivation animates agency
action that is fundamentally unreviewable, be it a grant of preclearance or a less
transparent action that strategically delays such grants. These latter cases raise
distinct and more troubling concerns that are beyond the scope of this Article. I1
Where, however, judicial review is available, my claim is that partisan use
of the VRA by the DOJ (and, indeed, other actors) is not the cause for concern
it is often made out to be and instead often has beneficial consequences. The
first Part of this Article explains why. It shows why core concerns about
partisan use of the VRA by the DOJ are misplaced, why the practice helps elicit
viable, rather than frivolous, claims, and the ways in which it is best seen as a
response to, rather than the cause of, racially infused redistricting disputes.
The second Part of this Article suggests that an unduly narrow conception
8. AAG Perez, of course, said no such thing, and in fact has disclaimed partisan
motivation entirely. See Toeplitz & Miller, supra note 7.
9. See infra notes 14-15. This argument is part of a larger project that explores the
various ways parties use the federal civil rights regime to extract benefits seemingly
unrelated to the regime's more lofty goals. See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, The Role of Resistance
and the Future ofAnti-Discrimination Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
10. See Associated Press, S.C. Leaders to Talk About Fed Voter ID Law Case, POST
& COURIER (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2012/jan/I 0/sc-leaders
-talk-about-fed-voter-id-law-case (reporting that the DOJ moved to block a law requiring
voters to show state or federal photo identification when voting in person).
11. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Justice Staff Saw Texas Districting as Illegal: Voting
Rights Finding on Map Pushed by DeLay Was Overruled, WASH. PosT, Dec. 2, 2005, at Al
(reporting that "political appointees" in the Justice Department overruled a unanimous
recommendation of career attorneys and subjected them to a "gag" order).
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of what the VRA does underlies much of the skepticism about partisan use of
the statute. This Part argues that one of the VRA's most critical, albeit
overlooked, functions is its provision of a forum in which to resolve competing
views about minority political participation in a majoritarian system. Partisan-
infused enforcement actions make use of this familiar, structured forum and
highlight its operation.
1. ON FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS AND "RACIALIZED" DISPUTES
In redistricting disputes, partisan use of the VRA typically involves casting
injuries caused by partisan gerrymandering in racial terms. Some partisan
moves are said to cause retrogression within the meaning of section 5 of the
statute, while others are alleged to result in racial vote dilution under section
2.12 Either way, partisan-infused VRA claims are routinely viewed with
considerable skepticism. 13
One concern is that such claims are factually unfounded or even frivolous,
given that they are "manufactured" to serve goals other than the ones the VRA
was ostensibly enacted to address. Because redistricting disputes are partisan at
their core, the thought is that politics, rather than race, dictates the challenged
districting moves, and that those unhappy with the results suffer primarily, or
perhaps exclusively, as members of the losing political party and not as
members of a particular racial group.14 That is, they are said to suffer no
12. If we assume partisan motivation, Texas v. United States is an example of the
first, and League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006), is an
example of the second. See also Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 14-15 (2009) (plurality
opinion) (describing North Carolina's claim that section 2 of the VRA trumps a state
constitutional ban on splitting counties among electoral districts).
13. See, e.g., Heather Gerken, Coloring Inside the Lines: Will the Voting Rights Act
Stop Republicans from Redistricting as They Please?, SLATE (Nov. 10, 2010, 4:16 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2274411/ (calling reliance on VRA in partisan gerrymandering
disputes "cynical").
14. See, e.g., Note, The Implications of Coalitional and Influence Districts for Vote
Dilution Litigation, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2598, 2616-17 (2004) (arguing that "the allegation of
racial injury to remedy partisan disadvantage" is "a problem that has plagued" voting rights
litigation and one that "place[s] undue strain on [the VRA] by improperly forcing the Act to
accommodate partisan as well as racial harms"); see also Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to
Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1705, 1733 (1993) ("That both
major political parties are in fact trying to commandeer the Voting Rights Act seems evident
. . . ."); Ron Levy, Regulating Impartiality: Electoral Boundary Politics in the
Administrative Arena, 53 McGILL L.J. 1, 52 (2008) (discussing the "rise of VRA litigation
by partisans" in which "[t]ests centered on racial representation increasingly became mere
points around which broader political contests focused"); Luke P. McLoughlin, Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act and City of Boerne: The Continuity, Proximity, and Trajectory of Vote
Dilution Standards, 31 VT. L. REv. 39, 88 (2006) ("[T]he VRA is transparently being used
for objectives different from those the law was intended to achieve . . . ."); Richard H.
Pildes, Is Voting Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the
2000s, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1517, 1552 (2002) (describing how existing doctrine "virtually
invites disappointed partisan actors to turn to the VRA and Shaw [v. Reno] as stalking horses
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cognizable racial injury under the VRA.
A related worry is that recasting a political battle in racial terms is not only
a factual error, but also the cause of distinct injury. More specifically, an often-
cited concern is that VRA claims pressed for partisan reasons "racialize" what
are fundamentally non-racial disputes. The fear is that recasting claims in this
manner worsens the very racial polarization the statute was designed to
reduce.15
These concerns mistake cause and effect. To be sure, redistricting is almost
always a partisan affair, in which members of the dominant political party draw
district lines in ways that promise to maximize their power.16 And yet, such
gerrymanders are invariably implemented through race-based districting moves
that rely on the close connection between race and party affiliation in most
jurisdictions. For example, it was not happenstance that Georgia Democrats
implemented the gerrymander at issue in Georgia v. Ashcroft by "unpacking"
Black voters from majority-minority districts; nor was it an accident that
Texas Republicans shored up a vulnerable incumbent by removing 100,000
Latino voters from a Laredo congressional district in 2003. In these cases, the
resulting claims of race-based injury under the VRA (section 5 in the first,
section 2 in the second) were hardly ancillary distractions obscuring a purely
for pursuit of judicial forms of partisan advantages denied in the legislative struggle over
redistricting"). Claims alleging malapportionment under the Equal Protection Clause have
long been subject to a similar critique. See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (arguing for flexibility when evaluating the threshold for a valid
malapportionment claim given the link between race and politics); ROBERT G. DIXON, JR.,
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 465-66 (1968) (arguing that minority plaintiffs in Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), had partisan reasons, namely the displacement of a
Republican district, for seeking to "unpack" a super-majority African-American district).
15. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 593, 633 (2002) (discussing incentives "to racialize partisan disputes"); Samuel
Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line? Judicial Review of Political
Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 569 (2004) (arguing that the practice of
"repackaging essentially partisan claims" under the VRA "can have toxic consequences for
the political process as a whole"); Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding
Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent Protecting Gerrymanders,
116 HARv. L. REV. 649, 649-50 (2002) (seeking ways to "end the racialization of political
redistricting fights").
16. The exceptions involve various efforts at reform that seek to excise partisanship
from the redistricting calculus. See, e.g., Background on Commission, CALIFORNIA CITIZENS
REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/commission.html (last visited
Feb. 22, 2012); Adam Clymer, Democracy in Middle America: Why Iowa Has so Many Hot
Seats, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2002), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/27/
weekinreview/the-nation-democracy-in-middle-america-why-iowa-has-so-many-hot-seats
.html?scp=1&sq=adam%20clymer/o20hot%20seats%20iowa&st=cse.
17. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 470-71 (2003); Issacharoff, supra note 5,
at 1730 (recognizing the inextricable link between race, redistricting, and partisan
representation described in Georgia v. Ashcroft).




partisan dispute, but instead were the predictable and unavoidable consequence
of the gerrymanders themselves.19
Put differently, the VRA claims brought in these cases did not "racialize"
non-racial disputes. The disputes were racial from the start. They were racial
because the disputed gerrymanders were constructed through sequential racial
moves. True, those moves were also political but, as Sam Issacharoff and Rick
Pildes observed fifteen years ago, "[r]ace and politics are intertwined in nearly
impenetrable ways" in redistricting disputes. Just as this linkage renders
efforts to disentangle the role played exclusively by race "artificial and unduly
explosive,",21 it also exposes as flawed the insistence that the pursuit of partisan
gain precludes racial injury under the VRA. That politics plays a role, even a
predominant one, does not, and should not, resolve the question of statutory
injury under the VRA. No one should be surprised that viable VRA claims
result when race-based tactics are used to secure partisan ends.
Partisan-propelled VRA claims of this sort may well be "manufactured" in
the sense that partisanship animates their assertion (or so this Article assumes).
Still, such manufacture does not mean the claims are necessarily frivolous or
otherwise contrived. In fact, what looks like partisan use of the VRA has
repeatedly helped elicit credible claims that might otherwise have lacked a
proponent, or that would have been litigated less effectively had the quest for
partisan advantage not been pursued.
For example, the legal claim the Bush Administration pressed to challenge
the Democratic gerrymander disputed in Georgia represented a credible
reading of the statute. Even if we assume that the prospect of partisan gain was
the animating force, the argument identified nontrivial injuries suffered by
minority voters under the redistricting plan engineered by Georgia
Democrats.22 To be sure, that argument lost in the Supreme Court, but along
the way it captured the votes of six federal judges, including the four most
"liberal" Justices at the time, and was (arguably) codified by Congress in
2006.23
19. See Ellen D. Katz, Reviving the Right to Vote, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163, 1163-64
(2007).
20. See Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes, No Place for Political
Gerrymandering, TEX. LAW., Aug. 5, 1996, at 25 (describing as folly the effort to determine
whether race "predominate[d]" when district lines are drawn).
21. Id.; see also Richard H. Pildes, Diffusion of Political Power and the Voting
Rights Act, 24 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 119, 138 (2000) ("Any doctrine that seeks to single
out racial gerrymandering without simultaneously addressing partisan gerrymandering is
destined to be highly artificial, at best, and perhaps altogether unintelligible.").
22. See Georgia, 539 U.S. at 495 (Souter, J., dissenting); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F.
Supp. 2d 25, 76 (D.D.C. 2002); Karlan, supra note 5, at 28 (2004); cf Richard H. Pildes,
Political Competition and the Modern VRA, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTs ACT 1, 6
(David L. Epstein, Rodolfo 0. de la Garza, Sharyn O'Halloran & Richard H. Pildes eds.,
2006) (describing a denial of preclearance in Georgia v. Ashcroft as a "perversion of the
VRA").
23. See Georgia, 539 U.S. at 495 (Souter, J., dissenting); Georgia, 195 F. Supp. 2d at
4212012]
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So too, consider Bartlett v. Strickland, a section 2 case that one might fairly
suppose was pursued because North Carolina Democrats saw partisan
advantage in reading the VRA broadly to displace a state constitutional
provision. Assuming, for present purposes, that partisanship propelled the
litigation, the statutory reading pressed by the state officials was still a
plausible one, and one that, in my view at least, would have productively
advanced voting rights jurisprudence.24 True, George W. Bush's Justice
Department opposed their reading, and the Supreme Courts of North Carolina
and of the United States both rejected it. Still, the state officials persuaded four
Justices that their reading was sound and prompted Ruth Bader Ginsburg to call
for congressional action to codify their view.25
Finally, even if we assume partisanship informed the Obama
Administration's position in Texas v. United States, the Department of Justice
is pressing several credible VRA claims in the case.26 To be sure, various civil
rights groups have intervened to press similar arguments, but their claims are
distinct and reach more broadly, challenging additional aspects of Texas's 2011
redistricting project that the Obama Administration deemed compliant with the
statute. How the DOJ's more targeted claims ultimately fare remains to be seen.
That they raise credible readings of the statute seems clear.27
More generally, then, the simple fact that partisan concerns may animate
claims under the VRA does not mean the claims necessarily lack merit. The
race-based ways partisan aims are achieved in the redistricting process
repeatedly has given rise to substantial claims of racial injury under the VRA.
That such claims do not always succeed in judicial proceedings does not mean
they rested on insubstantial or otherwise flimsy legal arguments.
In short, a partisan motive may not be the problem it is often feared to be.
Such motives may generate sound statutory claims that respond to and reflect
the unavoidable racial nature of many contemporary electoral disputes. Indeed,
by pushing back against racially informed redistricting moves by the state
actors of the opposing party, partisan use of the VRA may actually facilitate the
statute's operation. Some redistricting moves may be animated by racial
28
animus; others reflect the legacy of once-widespread animus that today
76; Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J.
174 (2007) (discussing legislative history behind the "Georgia v. Ashcroft fix").
24. See Ellen D. Katz, Engineering the Endgame, 109 MICH. L. REv. 349, 370-71
(2010).
25. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 44 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
26. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment Pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 and Request for Three-Judge Court, Texas v. United States, No. 1:11 -cv-
01303 (RMC-TBG-BAH) (D.D.C. July 19, 2011), available at http://legaltimes.typepad
.com/files/texas-complaint.pdf; Order, Texas v. United States, No. 1:11-cv-01303 (RMC-
TBG-BAH), (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://web.caller.com/2011/pdf/
DCRedistricting.pdf (denying summary judgment).
27. See Order, supra note 26.
28. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 440
422 [Vol. 23:2
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renders racially informed redistricting moves such an effective means to
advance partisan interests.29 Either way, partisan use of the VRA helps ensure
that worthwhile claims are pursued by operating as a check on the complex
ways party and race shape electoral lines.
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Apart from generating worries about frivolous claims and unnecessarily
racialized disputes, partisan use of the VRA presents a serious challenge to the
conventional narrative used to justify the regime. That narrative posits that the
VRA operates as a necessary constraint on active discrimination and the ill-
intentioned state and local actors inclined to engage in it.30 Partisan use of the
VRA is not easily reconciled with such a regime, and thus, is, on occasion,
taken to suggest the regime's obsolescence.
This Part argues otherwise. Partisan use of the VRA seems problematic
largely because the regime has been long understood too narrowly. Debate
tends to focus on whether or not the VRA remains necessary as a shield against
ongoing discrimination,31 while failing to appreciate a distinct yet critical role
the regime performs as an operational forum for dispute resolution. Through a
complex web of substantive norms and procedures, the regime provides a
venue in which interested parties resolve competing views about minority
political participation in a majoritarian system. Partisanship shapes these
competing views and propels the VRA claims that reflect them. As such,
partisan use of the VRA both relies on the regime and shows it to be a
mechanism for dispute resolution.
Consider, for example, the ongoing dispute over redistricting in Texas. The
(2006) (plurality opinion) (observing that the "State took away the Latinos' opportunity
because Latinos were about to exercise it" and that doing so "bears the mark of intentional
discrimination that could give rise to an equal protection violation").
29. See, e.g., Pamela Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of the
Century, 50 VAND. L. REV. 291 (1997) (discussing ways in which the VRA has shaped
partisan affiliation).
30. See, e.g., Motion to Affirm at 17, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder,
557 U.S. 193 (2009) (No. 08-322), 2008 WL 5079036; NINA PERALES, Luis FIGUEROA &
CRISELDA G. RIVAS, VOTING RIGHTS IN TEXAS 1982-2006, RENEWTHEVRA.ORG 39 (2006),
available at http://www.maldef.org/resources/publications/TexasVRA.pdf (arguing that the
VRA "is crucial to . . . guard against the backsliding that would occur if the VRA's
enforcement provisions were weakened or abandoned").
31. 1 have weighed in elsewhere. See Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the South? Regional
Variation and Political Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT
REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER 183
(A. Henderson ed., 2007); Ellen D. Katz, Congressional Power to Extend Preclearance: A
Response to Professor Karlan, 44 Hous. L. REv. 33 (2007); Ellen D. Katz, Mission
Accomplished?, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 142 (2007), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/
pdfs/613.pdf, Ellen D. Katz & Anna Baldwin, Why Counting Votes Doesn't Add Up: A
Response to Cox and Miles'Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 23
(2008), http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/108/23_KatzBaldwin.pdf
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state's population grew dramatically during the last decade, with most of the
growth occurring in the Latino community. When state officials set out to
redraw electoral districts to reflect this growth in population, the Republican
leaders who controlled the redistricting process sought to maximize the number
of seats their party would hold, while Democrats resisted that effort to the
extent they could. Predictably, the dispute centered on the number of electoral
districts in which Latino voters, who in Texas typically vote Democratic, would
exercise controlling influence. The question now being litigated is whether
various districting plans adopted by the Texas Legislature and signed into law
by the Governor last year provide a sufficient number of such districts given
the representational requirements of the Voting Rights Act.
Resolution of this question remains months and potentially years away.
Various, related questions have, thus far, immersed fifteen federal judges in
deeply partisan controversies that involve mounting allegations of bad faith and
misconduct in all directions.32 The Supreme Court has already been involved,33
and sufficient knotty issues remain that the Justices are likely to weigh in again
before the dispute is resolved. 34 Add in the fact that the underlying VRA claims
are the sort of claims that tend to generate worries about "racializ[ing] partisan
disputes,"35 and it is easy to find much to be unhappy about in Texas.
Even so, a closer look at this dispute enables us to see the ways in which
the VRA is doing critically important work. On the one hand, there is a
powerful argument that the VRA claims being pursued in the case address the
traditional concerns underlying the VRA and hence promise to advance its
36
mission. On the other hand, there is the distinct and equally important
assistance the regime is providing as an operational forum for dispute
resolution.
32. See TEX. REDISTRICTING, http://txredistricting.org (last visited May 10, 2012)
(collecting a number of documents, including briefs, court opinions, and statements by
government officials, relating to redistricting in Texas, many of which note misconduct and
bard faith on the part of many involved parties).
33. See Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012); see also Richard Hasen, Breaking
News: Supreme Court Decides Texas Redistricting Case, Reverses Lower Court, ELECTION
L. BLOG (Jan. 20, 2012, 7:25AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=28312 (noting decision is a
"big win" for Texas).
34. Assuming the VRA's preclearance process survives that long. See Shelby Cnty.
v. Holder, No. 10-651, 2011 WL 4375001 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2011) (appeal docketed).
35. See Issacharoff, supra note 15, at 633.
36. See, e.g., Nolan Hicks, State Redistricting Open to Lawsuit, Expert Says, Hous.
CHRON., Sept. 14, 2011, available at http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/State
-redistricting-open-to-lawsuit-expert-says-2171328.php (noting that the State's expert
witness testified that the plan causes retrogression); News Release, MALDEF, Supreme
Court's Ruling in Perez v. Perry Affirms Preclearance Provisions of Voting Rights Act,
http://www.maldef.org/news/releases/perez vsperry (noting that "Latinos accounted for
65% of the population growth in Texas, and that Latinos are largely responsible for Texas




Admittedly, this latter claim may strike some as curious and even
implausible given the complexity and vitriol that has marked the Texas dispute
to date and that undoubtedly promises to continue. And yet, closer examination
shows that, even in Texas on these facts, the VRA is productively aiding
resolution of this dispute. Understanding why requires that we examine three
distinct components that together constitute the dispute resolution service
provided by the VRA. One structural, one modulating, and one prescriptive, all
three are on display and at work in the Texas dispute.
First, the structural component. The very existence of the VRA means that
public officials in Texas did not need to create a process to resolve divisive
questions about representation on their own. Thus, when the 2010 census data
revealed Texas would gain four additional congressional seats and that Latino
residents comprised the majority of the population growth that led to the award
of those seats, state officials had no need to consider whether the Latino
community should be able to assert group-based claims to political power or
the nature of the process by which questions of this sort should be addressed.
That is, they had no need to confront or resolve troublesome foundational
questions about equality and participation or craft rules and procedures to
govern how such questions are to be addressed. The VRA had already set up
both the substantive norms and the procedural framework to guide their
application, and state officials knew they needed to comport with both.
These procedures and norms, moreover, are performing a significant
modulating function. Because of the VRA, the question of how much political
control the Latino community in Texas should exercise is being addressed not
in an open-ended inquiry into what abstract notions of fairness or equality
might dictate, but instead, with a far more concrete and narrow examination of
what the VRA mandates.
To be sure, the latter question remains hotly disputed. The question of how
much representation Texas's Latino community "should" receive under the
VRA is a controversial one, with sound arguments supporting a variety of
interpretations. Hardly something to lament, such indeterminacy is an
unavoidable component of any contemporary debate about representation. The
VRA's contribution is not that it eliminates all uncertainty or divisive debate,
but rather that it provides the terms under which that debate will occur and the
procedures those engaged in it must follow. State and local officials can rely on
the framework to guide and temper contentious debates through a structured
discussion.
More generally, then, when disputes arise (as they inevitably will), the
VRA's terms modulate inherently difficult discussions regarding complex
questions like the distribution of political power by channeling debate through
a structured inquiry. Even if state and local officials were inclined and able to
structure such an inquiry on their own, 37 the VRA means they need not devote
37. Assuming the Constitution presently gives them sufficient authority to do so.
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the time, energy, and resources required to do so. When disputes arise,
moreover, federal law helps ensure that the resulting fights, while undeniably
contentious, are also circumscribed, focusing on what federal law requires
rather than on the more open-ended question of what is normatively fair. This
more limited inquiry lets the parties avoid full ownership over the claims and
thereby usefully lowers the heat on divisive topics.38
Of course, the VRA does more than provide structure to debate and
modulate its tone. The regime also has an important prescriptive component.
That is, the norms and procedures it sets forth have substantive content and that
content is meant to be consequential in ways that advance the regime's
traditional mission. This prescriptive component, however, also contributes to
the regime's role as a forum for dispute resolution.
Again, the Texas dispute helps us see why. Under the VRA, it has long
been established that public officials in places like Texas cannot implement
electoral changes until they obtain federal approval, or preclearance, certifying
that the changes are not discriminatory in purpose or effect.39 State officials in
Texas have, as yet, been unable to show that their redistricting plans satisfy this
standard. In part, that is because the standard requires a showing that the plans
do not cause retrogression, that is, that they do not make things worse for
protected minority groups.40 What constitutes retrogression for a minority
community that has grown considerably in size and yet is decidedly not entitled
to proportional representation remains vehemently contested.41
In other words, the procedural and substantive requirements the VRA sets
forth and with which Texas must-at least for now 42--comply embody
numerous normative judgments. The idea of preclearance reflects mistrust that
the ordinary political processes in designated jurisdictions will adequately
protect the participatory rights of particular minority groups. The concept of
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720-21
(2007) (holding that local officials lacked authority to implement non-remedial race-based
school assignment plan); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 997 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("The State may not engage in districting based on race except as reasonably necessary to
cure the anticipated § 2 violation, nor may it use race as a proxy to serve other interests.").
38. Cf Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights
and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 735 (1998) (arguing that one
benefit of a "results-based" test for discrimination is that it avoids "requiring courts to label
[anyone] as racist").
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006).
40. See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
41. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment Pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 and Request for Three-Judge Court, Texas v. United States, No. 1:11 -cv-
01303 (RMC-TBG-BAH) (D.D.C. July 19, 2011), available at http://legaltimes.typepad
.com/files/texas-complaint.pdf; Order, Texas v. United States, No. 1:11-cv-01303 (RMC-
TBG-BAH), (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://web.caller.com/2011/pdf/
DCRedistricting.pdf (denying summary judgment).
42. See supra note 36.
43. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 393 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) (noting that the
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retrogression is meant to guard against "backsliding" in the political power
enjoyed by racial minorities, and thus guards the status quo as a baseline
entitlement.44 And the very idea that Latino voters should exert controlling
influence in at least some districts posits that vote dilution is legally cognizable
and that a sufficient number of factual conditions that give rise to it exist.45
Needless to say, the VRA's terms and procedures are not the only way to
structure debates about equality and fairness in the political process. In one
view, the value of the VRA as a forum for dispute resolution lies not in its
manifest superiority to other methods, or even in the statute's undeniable
historic salience, but instead simply in its very existence as a means to assess
and resolve questions of equality.
And yet, the VRA's rules are meant to operate not merely as salient focal
points,46 but as the expression of normative commitments we share. Thus, in
Texas, the VRA demands that state officials get federal approval before
implementing new districting plans, but otherwise leaves to these officials the
task to develop those plans and electoral rules more generally.47 Likewise, the
VRA demands that Texas craft its district boundaries in ways that recognize the
Latino community possesses a group-based claim to representation, but makes
48
clear that the State need not provide proportional representation.
In other words, these provisions of the VRA chart a middle course between
fixed extremes. By allowing group-based claims without mandating rigid
quotas or guaranteed results, these rules, at least arguably, reflect the shared
normative commitments and more inclusive politics federal anti-discrimination
law aspires to express. By so doing, moreover, the federal regime guards
against the vagaries of local majoritarian politics that left unchecked might
approach foundational questions of equality from a less general perspective and
in ways that enshrine these more fixed extremes.
By opting for more fluid rules, the federal regime invites dispute about
their application. This is by design. Ultimately, the VRA, like federal anti-
preclearance regime "shift[s] the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the
evil to its victims").
44. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) ("[T]he purpose of § 5 has
always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise.").
45. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (listing three preconditions
to liability based on vote dilution under section 2 of the VRA); S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29
(1982) (listing various factors that contribute to liability under section 2 of the VRA). But
see Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 893-94 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that vote
dilution is not a concept capable of judicial administration and that the Court's jurisprudence
on the subject is deeply flawed).
46. See generally THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54-57 (1960).
47. See Michael Halberstam, The Myth of "Conquered Provinces": Probing the
Extent of the VRA's Encroachment on State and Local Autonomy, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 923, 948
(2011).
48. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
2012] 427
STANFORD LAW & POLICYREVIEW
discrimination law more generally, is premised on the idea that some fights are
worth having. As traditionally understood, the regime insists that we examine,
and, at times, displace, the ways in which past discrimination entrenches
inequality.4 9 Understood somewhat differently, however, the regime may also
be seen to recognize that some disputes are unavoidable. The legacy of
discrimination is such that a less fluid system would not preclude disputes, but
instead would shift the terrain on which they are fought. By its very terms,
then, the VRA assumes a critical role in shaping the terms under which such
disputes proceed, with the hope that doing so makes productive outcomes more
likely.
The result is an imperfect, yet vibrant and necessary forum for dispute
resolution. With its structural, modulating, and prescriptive components, this
forum provides state and local officials critical assistance in resolving difficult,
recurring issues. State and local officials can rely on this system, and this
reliance empowers them in critical ways.
By empowerment, I mean something distinct from the noted way in which
the VRA helps beleaguered local officials striving to resist the discriminatory
impulses of local majorities. While mindful that the statute provides critical
political cover to such officials to "do the right thing" in the absence of political
capital to do so independently,50 my claim is that the VRA empowers all state
and local officials regardless of their inclination to resist or conform to
majoritarian desires. That is, the structural, modulating, and prescriptive
components of the regime aid all public officials, from those most resistant to
traditional mission of the VRA to those most steadfastly committed to it.
Put differently, the VRA (like federal civil rights law more generally)
operates not unlike the Constitution itself. Not simply the rope that binds us to
the mast, or more mundanely, the insight to place the alarm clock out of reach,
the regime not only inhibits discriminatory conduct, but also affirmatively
enhances local power through the very constraints it imposes on it. It is an
49. See generally IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (2003).
50. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221,
265 (D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S.
193 (2009) (describing how a city attorney reportedly blocked local efforts to dismantle
majority-Black district simply by stating "listen, you can't do it . .. under any interpretation
of [section 5]"); see also Voting Rights Act: An Examination of the Scope and Criteria for
Coverage under the Special Provisions of the Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 98 (2005) (statement of Armand
Derfner, Voting Rights Attorney, Derfner, Altman & Wilborn), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/medialpdfs/printers/109th/24034.pdf ("[Proposals] .. . never even
get off the ground because it's understood that they will not get precleared .... ); Karlan,
supra note 38.
51. See also JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY 65-77 (1979); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 83-87
(1984). See generally Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 227 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988)
(distinguishing, in another context, between disabling and enabling rules, noting that the
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enabling tool that helps state and local officials get on with what Daryl
Levinson has aptly called "the profitable business of collective
decisionmaking." State and local officials need not be ill-intentioned to
"benefit from pre-established procedures for resolving conflicts"53 and the
tempering quality and direction they bring to necessarily contentious issues.
To be sure, there are those who believe federal anti-discrimination law
ought not be available to "ease[] the lot of public officials" and diminish their
need to take sides or otherwise assume responsibility over divisive questions. 54
In my view, however, providing a structure for dispute resolution, with the
modulation and, yes, cover, it affords, is perhaps the most important function of
the contemporary civil rights regime. The local is not always the best nexus at
which to conduct struggles over equality,55 and, in many cases, the benefits of
wholly local resolution are far outweighed by the costs divisive battles
engender. Public officials themselves may be hostile to the goals underlying the
federal civil rights regime, or a majority (or large minority) of their constituents
may be. As likely, however, the problem may be that questions of equality are
inherently and inescapably difficult, such that, even among people of good will,
extreme, and, at times, ugly, viewpoints can find expression and make common
ground ever harder to find. To the extent federal civil rights law helps to
structure debate and thereby tone down such expression, it is performing
valuable service.
Understanding the VRA to provide this service, moreover, not only yields
a more complete portrait of what the statute does, but also exposes an
underappreciated aspect of what would be lost in its absence. I think one reason
the VRA is presently vulnerable is precisely because its role has been
understood too narrowly. Supporters tend to defend the VRA as a constraint on
local autonom justified by the continuing need to address ongoing
discrimination. Opponents counter that the statute has become an undue
burden no longer justified by contemporary conditions.57 The merits of that
latter allow people to do "many things they would not otherwise have been able to do or
even have thought of doing").
52. See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of
Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARv. L. REv. 657, 675 (2011); see also Holmes, supra
note 51, at 237 (noting that "even a perfectly rational, clear-eyed and virtuous future
generation could benefit from preestablished procedures for resolving conflicts").
53. See supra note 51.
54. See, e.g., Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1574 (1lth Cir.
1994) ("The Constitution was not designed to ease the lot of public officials, and it is not the
role of federal courts to insulate public officials from the people. Instead, woven throughout
the Constitution is a commitment to democratic self-rule, making public officials answerable
to the people.").
55. See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to
Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2341 (2003).
56. See supra note 30.
57. See e.g., Appellant's Brief, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. I v. Holder, 557
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debate aside, the VRA does far more than constrain active discrimination by
local officials. Indeed, even if that discrimination has diminished to the degree
opponents suggest,5 8 the regime nevertheless is still providing localities critical
assistance resolving difficult issues that are the legacy of that discrimination.
These issues are recurring and unavoidable, concerning things like how
much political influence Latino voters in Texas should have and which
electoral structures best serve to achieve that influence. These issues, moreover,
are not amenable to permanent resolution, not because racist intentions
necessarily shape their resolution (though they may well do so), but because the
discrimination that originally made the VRA necessary and our longstanding
efforts to address it have shaped contemporary politics in enduring ways. The
result is that all public officials, be they of good will or not, unavoidably
confront complex, intractable conflicts for which sound arguments support a
variety of outcomes. The VRA provides all of these officials vital assistance as
a forum in which to address and resolve these conflicts.
This assistance should do more than bolster the VRA's validity. This
function provides an independent basis and justification for the VRA itself. To
be sure, to withstand pending legal challenges, the statute must be shown to be
a congruent and proportional remedy for a constitutional violation, 59 a standard
that largely explains why contemporary debates about the VRA focus on the
regime's role in deterring and constraining intentional racial discrimination.
And yet, the importance of the VRA's role as a congressionally mandated
forum for dispute resolution also derives from its close connection to
unconstitutional conduct. The constitutional violations the VRA was enacted
and extended to address are why present redistricting disputes are so divisive,
difficult, and complex. Those violations are the reason an external dispute
resolution mechanism remains necessary today and why the VRA has the
enabling qualities identified above. Put differently, a full remedy for the
constitutional injuries that gave rise to the VRA requires more than outlawing
the offending conduct. It requires a mechanism to deal with its lasting
consequences.
U.S. 193 (2009) (No. 08-322), 2009 WL 453246; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp.
2d 424 (D.D.C. 2011).
58. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1,
557 U.S. 193 (No. 08-322) ("Well, that's like the old-you know, it's the elephant whistle.
You know, I have this whistle to keep away the elephants. You know, well, that's silly. Well,
there are no elephants, so it must work."); see also Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 429
(2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the VRA may no longer be as necessary as it once
was).
59. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
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